The Impact of Different Ethnicities in the Realization of Political Federalism in Iraq, from Post Saddam to 2018

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ABSTRACT

The geopolitical features of Iraq make it divided into northern, central, and southern regions, each of which has its own origins. In the northern and Kurdish regions, their main concern is the establishment of federalism and the annexation of Kirkuk (the disputed area between the Kurds, Sunni Arabs and Turkmen, which accounts for 40% of Iraq's oil). Such a claim, of course, has created a gulf between the Kurds and the Arabs (Shiite-Sunni), and at this point, the Kurds are facing the Arabs. In the southern regions, most of them Shiites (60% of Iraq's oil), they are in some way influenced by the Shiites of the neighboring countries (especially the Islamic Republic of Iran); this opposes Sunni Arabs and the Kurds against the Shiites, which put the Iraqi government in has been handed. But in the central region where mainly Sunni Arabs live there, reasons like very bad weather and the lack of suitable soil for agriculture and the lack of oil will make it whenever you whisper Kurdish federalism (the Kurdistan climate and the annexation of Kirkuk) and Shi'a federalism (Basra area) And the Shiite area of (the south), Sunni Arabs appear to face the Kurds and Shiites.

In the administrative system of Iraq, the undesirable managerial quality of the ruler makes each director, rather than seeking the efficiency of the administrative system, pay more attention to his ethnic and tribal interest, and this harasses other groups and tribes. Another obstacle to the achievement of national unity is the paradox in creating a national government, which itself will be a barrier to security and democracy, which will affect the patterns of governance in the region and add to the paradox. This article presents an analytical overview of the Iraqi society and how their ethnic relations and their internal rivalries for political power and the appropriation of Iraqi government positions after the collapse of Saddam Hussein and the formation of new political institutions and the recognition of all ethnicities and religions in the law will be essential.

Keywords: Iraq, federalism, political groups, government patterns

INTRODUCTION

In the present day, the study of international relations and strategic research, especially those related to geopolitical politics, is of particular importance. Since geopolitics is in fact the geographic results of a policy, in a geopolitical analysis, it seeks to establish a relationship between the international power centers and the geographic regions, and its purpose is to explain the role of the geographic agents in the politics of the countries; Because political events always occur in a geographic environment and geographic factors influence the process of political phenomena, paying attention to all environmental factors, both human and inhuman, tangible and intolerable, the international political environment to It cannot be fully understood; in the field of international relations, political actors enjoy total freedom. Not severely influenced by geographical factors and other factors and therefore limited in decision making.

The significance of existing interests and tensions in the Middle East region is primarily due to the fact that in this part of the world the boundaries of several geopolitical sets of world dimensions are interconnected and interrupted. On the other hand, there is a regional issue that is particularly politically unstable. Because a significant part of the countries in the region compete with each other and are seeing increasing internal tensions.
Ethnic-religious disputes and conflicts threaten the components of security, namely territorial integrity, society and even the legitimacy of the regime. Ethnic societies have more resistance to crises or social rupture because they are ethnically and perhaps religiously fairly coherent, but peaceful coexistence is not permanent in many segmented societies.

By inculcating loyalty to the homeland, governments are attempting to implement the process of political socialization and declare that the propagation of ethnic differences does not necessarily contribute to ethnic coherence and integration. Ethnic disputes and conflicts threaten not only the territorial integrity of the regime and countries with the threat of separatism, but also make it vulnerable to foreign intervention; examples of such an event can be seen in Iraq's support for the Kurds of Iran and Iranian support for Kurds in Iraq during the 1970s.

Also, the density of ethnic groups in areas that have vital resources for the country can be dangerous, as ethnic groups may sabotage and blow up, which has a negative effect on the country's economic prosperity. A more serious threat is when these groups cut off government access to vital resources; for example, concentration in the oil-rich areas of northern Iraq forced the country to move towards the displacement of Kurds in 1975 slowly. Most ethnic groups may be in poverty and deprivation and discriminate against welfare or economic facilities and political participation, and this situation will exacerbate their dissatisfaction. The collision of Saudi and Bahraini governments with their Shiites and the Turkish government's encounter with Kurds in the south-east of Anatolia is a clear illustration of this situation. The questions raised in this article are that the role of ethnic groups in defending the new political federalism in Iraq? Are relatives and groups in Iraq going to interact or oppose? Is Iraq the best option for federalism or democracy?

In response to the above questions, the analytical indicators should be considered as follows:

**Ethnic Geography**

**Triple Characteristics of Iraqi Political Geography**

The definition of the nation in modern science shows that the nation is a definite human community that lives in a specific geographic region and has a common cultural background. Iraq, like many other countries with heterogeneous ethnicities, has a relatively heterogeneous culture. However, only 15 of the 188 countries of the world have a comparative cultural identity, but these fifteen purely ethnic nations are also affected by immigration and blending, which are characteristics of globalization. They gradually lose their purity. Iraq emerged in 1921 as a modern state and, like many countries, sought its own people. Namely, Iraq was not, in fact, the product of a nation that sought to establish a state (country), contrary to what happened in Germany or Italy in the nineteenth century. On the other hand, the people of this country were of different ethnic and religious backgrounds. So far, despite the efforts made to establish a strong social bond between the people of the country, there is still a belief that people from the Iraqi people cannot be spoken.

There is almost a consensus among the Arab historians that Mesopotamian rulers from 2000 BC to the present day pursued the common goal of creating unity between the northern and southern parts of the Tigris and Euphrates, and the political coherence between these regions. The history of Mesopotamia is a description of the often unsuccessful attempts of the rulers of the region to achieve this main goal. Iraq was once established when there was basically no idea of government and nationalism in the minds of the Iraqi people. For example, Mosul considered India as a mediator in business rather than thinking about Baghdad. In addition, the competition between the two Iranian and Ottoman Empires was continuous. The population of the businessmen brought in a new region that this demographic change was sometimes a threat to the formation and consolidation of the identity of the national unit in Iraq. In terms of territory, the integrity of the political structure of this country was also controversial. From a series of treaties and international agreements and border agreements (Alishahi & Mohammad oust, 2017).

This same political ignorance and interest-seeking has led Iraq to become a national-civilian state, in which all social groups have a shared responsibility. The Qur'is and Shiites faced a major problem in the society, and the citizen-class the second was accounted for. (Seifzadeh, 2000: 53-54) The highest obstacle to the unification of Iraq is the separation between
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The majority of Arabs and the Kurdish language. Kurds are concentrated in remote and mountainous regions of the country, which are 1.3 times the size of the country, and are bound by the boundaries Infiltration of their own speakers in Turkey, Iran and Syria. The Kurds have fought for independence without complete overthrow, when they became part of the Iraqi government due to the desire of the foreign powers. (Firouzi, 2005: 151).

The second characteristic of Iraq’s political geography is the problems that have arisen over the establishment of federalism in the country. (Nayyeri, 2003: 70) One of the problems in this context is the issue of Kirkuk. The city of Kirkuk, the capital of the Al-Taim province of Iraq, is located 250 kilometers north of Baghdad and is a city with five thousand years of history. There are a lot of disagreements over the demographic composition of this city. The Kurdish resources, the majority of the population belong to the Kurds, the Arab sources to the Arabs and some Turkmen sources, to the Turkmens. In addition to the multi-ethnic fabric of the city, the other reason for the disagreement is the presence of rich oil resources in the city. In total, Kirkuk holds 40% of Iraq's oil reserves.

The most important demands of the Kurds in the current situation are the consolidation of Kurdish federalism and the annexation of Kirkuk and other Kurdish regions outside Kurdistan to the region under the sovereignty of this climate. Based on this request, a map published in July 2005, this map, in addition to the three provinces of Duhok, Erbil and Sulaimaniyah, which had been in control of the Kurds since 1992, introduced new areas of Tamil Province to central Kirkuk, the Kurdish Kurdish regions of Diyala, at the center of Khangin, Mandlian, Jansan, Badirah and Zarbatie areas in the region between Baghdad and the Mehran border of Iran, as well as the areas on the border of Mosul to Kurdistan. (Veisi, 2008:19) The Kurds have always defined their relations with other Iraqi groups, according to their main goal at this point, namely, achieving maximum autonomy in northern Iraq. The actions and statements of Iraqi Kurdish leaders, including Barzani and Talabani, indicate a special relationship between them and the political structure of Iraq, meaning that the Kurds will only remain within the framework of the Iraqi state only if their regional government and their maximum autonomy are realized, and in Otherwise, they cannot be defined within the framework of Iraq (Asadi, 2005: 6). The analytical basis for this request is that the Kurds are Arabs and Kurds, separate from each other. First, the existence of these two different nations must be recognized in Iraq. In contrast, Arabs and Turkmens oppose Kirkuk's accession to the Kurdistan region, and they see it as the basis for the formation of an independent Kurdish state. In this regard, Turkey has explicitly stated that this annexation is its red line in the military invasion of Iraqi Kurdistan. At the same time, according to article 140 of the Iraqi constitution, it is stipulated that the status of Kirkuk and other disputed areas should be determined in the framework of the referendum. This article provides a way to normalize the situation, counting the population and referendum in Kirkuk and other disputed lands before December 31, 2007. Despite the formation of the follow-up committee under article 140, the referendum on Kirkuk has not yet been held. The reason for this is the kind of nationalistic Shiite approach led by Nouri al-Maliki. It tends to delay the Kirkuk referendum rather than openly opposed to Kirkuk's accession to the Kurdish climate through administrative and governmental barriers. (Veisi, 2008). However, the fate of Kirkuk is tied to the fate of federalism and, to a large extent, of democracy in Iraq. It symbolizes the linkage of the structural reality of the political geography and political economy of Iraq, with its acting type that can undermine the balance of ethnicity in Iraq, and even affect the Middle East. Iraq is also a country belonging to the Middle East security complex and the Persian Gulf security subdivision, in which conflict and militancy is not an exception but an act of acting (Buzan, 2005: 100).

From this perspective, many Kurds, even Kirkuk, are compared to Jerusalem's strategic position in the Arab-Muslim conflict with the Zionist regime. In the 2010 parliamentary elections, out of 12 Kirkuk seats in the Iraqi parliament, six seats were added to the Al-Arabiyyah, composed of Arabs and Turkmens, and the Kurds, indicating a weakening of positions compared to the 2005 parliamentary elections, with a fragile ethnic balance in it showed the region and the whole of Iraq. There is also a different sensitivity to the situation in Basra. On May 30, 2010, Nouri al-Maliki, who won her list in the Basra parliamentary elections with 14 seats, announced that if he succeeds in
Establishing a government, he will sign the Basra area autonomy law. Basra is one of the wealthiest Iraqi provinces, and the third largest in terms of population after Baghdad and Mosul. Its oil reserves account for about 20 percent of the Middle East's oil reserves. The conversion of the province to the federal area from the point of view of those who seek to develop Shiite areas is synchronized and balanced with the Kurdish regions of the north and is one of the solutions to ethnic balance in this country. At the same time, the autonomous Basra faces the opposition of Saudi Arabia's Sunni Arabs in terms of the geography and political economy of Iraq. Expansion of Shiite movements on the eastern borders of Saudi Arabia. The dependence of the Sunni Arabs on the privileged status of Basra and, most importantly, the development of the logic of the game in favor of Iran from the viewpoint of the Saudis is not acceptable. (Nasri, 2010: 51).

The third geopolitical feature of Iraq is its strategic position vis-a-vis Iran. As we said, the geopolitical situation in Iraq is such that it is the most appropriate region in the country to balance and control Iran, and historically the goal was to make it the same. At the same time, if this capacity is not exploited, or in other words, the sphere of influence of the Islamic Republic of Iran in Iraq is so wide that its potential and actual enemies cannot use this capacity, the country has the capacity to Bridge or jump board for Iran to enter the Shamit area and become the undisputed power of the Persian Gulf security subsystem. One of the reasons Bush was to change the US strategy in Iraq in 2007 was the same. On this basis, Rice and Bush, in justifying their new strategy for the US Congress, explicitly stated that "Iraq must be a barrier against Iran and not a bridge to it as before." (Al-Khafaji, 1999: 71).

Figure 1. Total 1 Iraqi Geopolitical Features

Geographical and Natural Challenges

The southern region and the Kirkuk region, due to oil resources and ties to the sea and Baghdad because of the center of government, are for the sake of the tribes and, consequently, the transnational powers of Iraq. The dispersion of ethnic groups in Iraq led Kurds to work in northern Iraq for contacting the Iranian Kurds, Turks and Syrians to form a large Kurdish people, and in spite of the efforts of governments to migrate to other areas, they still dominate the northern part of Iraq. Sunnis live in western Iraq around the borders of Syria and Jordan, and Shiites in southern and eastern Iraq bordered by Iran, Kuwait, Bahrain and Saudi Arabia. The presence of oil and gas resources in the south and the connection with the sea and the Shi'a's dominance in the area provide Shiites with opportunities and instruments that equally make the opportunity for other tribes a challenge. Therefore, this area is a political tool for the Shiites of Iraq, which can regulate its reputation with other nations in terms of the geographical presence of the region (Alishahi & Forouzan, 2018).
North of Iraq

The Kirkuk area in northern Iraq, which is on the borderline between the Sunni Kurds and Arabs, is of great and critical importance for the Kurds and Arabs because of its oil reserves. For this reason, at every stage of the history of these tribal elites, they attempted to seize Kirkuk and forced others to emigrate. Both the Sunni Arabs and the Kurds have historic claims that they are ruling Kirkuk. In addition, the presence of Turkmens and their claims to Kirkuk, which is supported by Turkey, is also being added to these parties. During the rule of the Ottomans, the border between the Kurds and the Arabs, which originated from Turkey and was connected to Kirkuk, Touz Khurmato, Jebel Hamrin and Khanqinin, was the location of the Turks who were actually protecting the Silk Road. Meanwhile, some Turkmens and Kurds of this region because of being Shiite, they belong to the Shiite area of Iraq, and they also coalited with Shiites in the elections. So, in the future of a destabilized Iraq, this region is ripe for conflicts and conflicts that have already begun to formally and hide behind this hostility. The depth of the disagreement is that the Kurds need Kirkuk's resources and economy to pursue their historic strategy for Kurdistan's independence, and without Kirkuk, their strategy will not be realized.

Similarly, Sunni Arabs will need Kirkuk to survive and fulfill their demands, and without Kirkuk and the south, they will not have a reason to continue living in western Iraq and may prefer immigration from Iraq. In addition, the Turkmens will have a dangerous future because of ethnic differences and religious differences if a nation dominates the region (Sunni or Kurdish Arabs), because in addition to decreasing minority, they may lose their historic land. Similarly, the interests of the Great Kurdistan, Turkey, Sunni region and regional conspirators will be challenged, and they will also be involved in this conflict and unwanted war. For this reason, the occupiers have silenced the Kirkuk issue and may be controlled by the international community in the distant future, such as the cities of Musat and Berechko in Bosnia, which the international community has been governing for many years. Unless Iraq is integrated with a national identity and Kirkuk is governed in Iraq alone. While the Kurds are seeking independence from Iraq, they imposed a federal government on Iraqi rulers and focused their efforts on the maximum settlement of Kurds in Kirkuk and the coalition with the Kirkuk minority (Alishahi & et all, 2019).

Southern Iraq

The economy and life of Iraq is in the southern region, because the connection with the sea and the existence of oil and gas resources in southern Iraq determine the importance of the whole of Iraq for national, regional and transnational powers. Apart from the Kurds who are opposed to the rule of Kirkuk, they are ready to take advantage of the South, the rest of the tribes and minorities regard their continuation in Iraq as a source of southern resources. Shiites with a population of 65% in Iraq can actually have maximum sovereignty and do not have a reason to insist on a federal government or any kind of government. In fact, the Sunni Arabs in Iraq and the region and the supranational powers are most sensitive to the fate of southern Iraq. Baghdad, with the vast majority of Shi'ites, is actually available to the Shiites, but for many years, Sunni Arabs were in control of Baghdad; the Kurds also have their political and geographical boundaries with the Arabs, which continue to be their ethnic and religious divide. Hermins know that they will face their own challenges and crises in every situation with different sovereignty, and only in unified Iraq, peaceful and peaceful life will be realized in those areas. (Akbari, 2009: 171-169).

The Origins of Ethnic-Religious Conflict

Political Culture in Iraq

The component that limits the realization of the idealist scenario in Iraq is the political culture of the people of this country or the set of civic, analytic, and political feelings. What transforms the political culture of society into a structural concept is the principle of its unconsciousness. This trait makes many thoughts, tendencies, and political inclinations less reviewed and of relative stability. (Fast al-Qalam, 1374: 15-14). The political culture of the Iraqi people also has two distinct attributes, which these attributes, Internal democratization and peace in the country's foreign policy are hampered by the tendency to domestic authoritarianism and lack of cooperation in foreign policy. These two characteristics can be called incoherent and violent.
Lack of Coherence in Iraq

The inconsistency of political culture in Iraq returns to its tribal and tribal fabric, and its division into three general societies, including Shi'a, Sunnis and Kurds. Article 43 of the Iraqi Permanent Constitution, which is under the rights and freedoms section, affirms its tribal and tribal fabric: The government focuses on the growth and advancement of Iraqi tribes and tribes, paying attention to their affairs, in line with religion, law and the promotion of human values and the promotion of the progress of society, and the custom of the tribes that are in conflict with human rights (Article 43 of the Iraqi constitution).

In fact, this feature represents a kind of culture that Almond and Verba call their classic culture of civil culture, called "local culture", which is characterized by a lack of sense of citizenship and prominence of local identity (Heywood-2002: 200).

Indeed, the existence of three distinct social groups in Iraq with different languages, different ethnicities, and the diversification of economic facilities has led to the emergence of a kind of pre-modern political culture with a limited range of loyalties to the ethnic, local, family and tribal levels, and the trust between Ethnic and inter-grouped at their lowest levels. In this context, the country is a collection of tribes and tribes that rival and compete for power, security and wealth, while at the same time not recognizing the central government as a legitimate authority. This feature makes the definition of a community or nation-state in Iraq not locally of the Arabs (Sariolghalam, 1995: 72)

This feature makes any ethnic balance in the Iraqi political arena temporary and fragile, especially if oil revenues and the use of oil rents are distributed and organized in a manner that is ethnically distributed, the formation of a homogeneous Iraqi society will be far from accessible. Was.

All of these long-term relationships have created a series of six-fold crisis of identity, legitimacy, influence, participation, integration and distribution within Iraq. Indeed, in the past years, all these crises existed, which, of course, was counterbalanced by a massive repression, and, as a result, an institutionalized autocracy. This system was used to cover a kind of "charisma leadership" to massive repression. (Borna Baldaji, 2004: 13).

Feature of Violence in Iraq

Iraq has a history of physical violence in political affairs. As failure at this level has contributed to the failure of the country to establish peaceful relations with the outside world. After the occupation of Iraq by the coalition forces, a new level of violence emerged as a terrorist movement in which the liberation of Iraq defined the foreign occupation as its main goal and was characterized by suicide operations. This unidentified combination of dissatisfied Sunni Arabs was the remains of the former government, especially the Ba'athist officers, some of the Iraqi tribes, the mafia groups and al-Qaeda in Iraq. In addition, most of the major political currents in Iraq have militant forces or part of the army under its control. This situation is an important challenge for the Iraqi government to recognize its right to monopolize the legitimacy of physical force and violence. This is a situation in which the nation-state literature refers to the so-called bankrupt governments. Accordingly, the bankrupt state is a government in which the main feature of the concept of the state in Max Weber's statement, namely the monopoly of the legitimacy of the use of physical force within its borders, has been broken. This is often done by warlords, militant groups and terrorists (Rotberg-2004: 43), all of which are in Iraq, including actors in the field of domestic politics. This feature, in the wake of any political transformation or political opportunity, the existing ethnic balance, which is the basis for the establishment of democracy in Iraq, collapses due to physical violence, which is mostly ethnic in nature. A typical example of this is the explosions and terrorist attacks following the 2010 parliamentary elections in Shiite areas of Iraq. Accordingly, in Iraq, no government can legitimately monopolize physical force before it prevails over other armed groups of the country's population in competing to prove which one can protect it better than the other. This feature represents the paradox of security and democracy in the future of Iraq. As it can prevent foreign policy from turning military policies into defensive rather than aggressive policies.

TRIBAL DIFFERENCES

Find Tensions

Although the constitution provides for privileged privileges among the tribes and the Shiites, at the expense of united Iraq, have more
privileges than the proportion of the population to the Kurds and Sunni Arabs, but Sunni Arabs also appeal to the whole constitution and Kurds in relation to Kirkuk. Also in the election debate, the Kurds and Sunni Arabs are trying to announce their population more than what they are. In this regard, Shiite Kurds, Turkmens and minorities such as Nomads in the Mosque and Yazidi (Yazidis) in the northwest of Iraq are heavily under pressure from Kurds and Sunni Arabs.

Hidden Tensions

In addition to apparent attempts to strengthen their power in the central government, the Iraqi people are secretly trying to expand their interests in the event of the chaos and the withdrawal of the occupiers. The brutal barbarism of the Shiites in the Sunni areas of Diyala, Madajen, Baghdad and Mosul by extreme Sunnis and the hijacked and seditionists seditionists that originate from the Zionists and threatening and forcing Shiites to emigrate indicate the Sunni minority's efforts to develop its geography. Similarly, the Ba'athist and Al-Qaeda fight against Shi'a and the brutal killings of women and children and the explosions in Karbala, Kazimin and Samarra do not imply the right of the Sunni Arabs, but declares war on the Shi'a to bring them back to withdraw their minimum wage demands To force. Also, the encouragement of Arabs' emigration from Kirkuk and Shiites from Mosul is also being interpreted in this regard. In the political sphere, the pressure of the Arab League and the terrorists with the support of Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and the West to prevent the provision of Shiite rights and the opposition of the Sunni Arab Iraqi constituencies to the electoral process and the constitution and lack of participation in the central government, including the secretive opposition of the Sunni, To the extent that radical Sunnis considered betrayal and forced death in government.

In the military debate, the Kurds maintained the organization and structure of Peshmerga, and this structure would only defend Kurds and Kurdish lands in all circumstances. It also formed the Homeland Security Agency (ASA) to defend its interests against threats. By creating a cluster of government, apart from the foreign ministry, they have all the elements of the government and can, in the worst cases, defend themselves. Sunni Arabs, who mainly support the Ba'athist coalition and al-Qaeda, are opposed to the US and ineffictual this incompatible weapon with the West introduced and implemented the idea of the Awakening Council (Sahwah), and today, about 90,000 members of the various Sunni Arab tribes are organized in their area and earn salaries from the central government. In fact, in the conditions of the Iraqi economic and security conditions, there is a military opportunity for the tribes. This compilation, based on interests, is a legitimate and credible tool in the hands of the Sunni Arab tribesmen who can defend their interests in any circumstances. Although 25,000 have entered the Iraqi Army, their combination of military-geographical milieu is essential for Sunni Arabs.

Shiites also formed the Mahdi Army (Jaish al-Mahdi). The collection, which is at the disposal of Muqtada al-Sadr, and consists mainly of young people aged 17 to 23, has a strong jihadi and epic spirit that the occupiers could not win over during the first two and first Najaf wars. Also, the experienced forces of the Badr Corps, now active in the political and governmental field, are among other Shiite military powers (Mohammaddoust; Khodayari & Alishahi, 2017). Therefore, all three peoples have an informal and non-public army, and, in a way, each tribe with regional and subregional powers maintains its link and is prepared for unusual conditions inside it. Although the current trend indicates a slowdown and ethnic clashes have stopped, many immigrants have returned to their homes. The cessation of al-Qa'ida and Ba'athist activity was not due to military authority - US security and the central government, but because of the decision of the Sunni Arab tribes to change the policy and not to support the radicals. So today, the most important security crisis in Iraq is the existence of a million security, military and law enforcement forces in Iraq that have not changed their demands and can become a serious crisis at any time. In fact, the massive presence of military forces - official and informal security in Iraq - is the main cause of the insecurity crisis in this country. (Akbari, 2009: 172).

Political-Security Crises in Iraq

Internal Factors

Provision of Group Interests

Preference for group interests by groups, tribes and parties will eliminate national unity. This is
the first issue in the Iraqi political and security area. If any party sees its interests during the course or events, it goes to that direction and may be sacrificed in this way. Parties are keen to be part of their party in macroeconomic management, and not so much in the country's macro and national interests. In Iraq, this culture has dominated the past.

The Distance Between People and Political Rulers

If the government and the nation are distanced and the people do not recognize the state, this is a threat to that country, and this is a scourge of the current Iraqi government. The Iraqi people are more interested in the Islamic Republic than their own government. Imam Khomeini (RA) is a model for them, especially in Shiite areas. Our exploitation of this case has not been desirable until now. It should be remembered that the absence of a government in Iraq (in the proper form), namely, the promotion of chaos and destruction, and this is a threat.

Unsuccessful Administrative System

Because the Iraqi administrative system is a hereditary system of tragedy, it cannot create a favorable situation for the people or always take rights. The Iraqi constitution (in the administrative system) has not been practically refined, and sometimes it is issued on a matter of high and controversial rulings. The Iraqi administrative system is more of a service to the affluent or influential circles. Corruption is raging in Iraq, and embezzlement involves bribes across the entire administrative system of the country. Iraqi strategic strategists have not yet shown themselves, perhaps one of the reasons is not security. Iraq is severely weak in the area of governance. Current Iraqi executives are developing bubbly and are being recruited based on party requests. In other words, the tribal and tribal management system and, in fact, the fungal system. Thousands of strategic strategists may be needed to run this country, but this is not the case. Lack of management means loss of funds, loss of human resources. If technicians are found, they will be rejected by him and will not allow him to express his existence.

Over-The-Top Managers

It is safe to say that a large part of the Iraqi administrative system is in the hands of extraversion managers who always imitate others in their management issues. These managers do not care about themselves and their possessions, and they mostly imitate Europe. This could be a threat to Iraq.

The Undesirable Qualities of the Armed Forces

There is no "military" and "command" command in Iraq. Arrangements are undesirable in defensive organizations, there is no incentive for military forces, training levels are low, duties Persons are not identified in detail, and the situation is unlike the defense organizations of Iran. For example, in Iran, the Supreme Command and Command is responsible for the "Commander-in-Chief" and the arrangements based on the principles and desirable training. Individuals are committed and motivated, and everything is clear; but in Iraq, it is a picture of Iran.

Unbalanced Nation

Today, one could speak of a country called "Iraq", but a concept called "Iraqi nation" can not yet be spoken. The borders of Iraq today are highly mixed peoples and have not yet been integrated into a common political entity with a common understanding of identity. Since the beginning of the British mandate on Iraq, the work of reconciling and integrating the people has continued steadily, but it has not ended in any way. The first and most serious ethnic division of the population, or more precisely, is the linguistic issue of the people of our border. The majority of the Arab-speaking population (about 75-80%) and the Kurdish minority (about 15-20%). Arabs have the western flanks and the valley of the Tigris and Euphrates from Basra to the Mosul plain, while the Kurds have built shelters in the rugged mountainous area of the north and east. Nevertheless, the Iraqi Kurds are only part of a massive Kurdish population that identifies their identity with cultural backgrounds, a common nationalist language. In 1973, the number of Kurds in northwestern Iran was 1.8 million (about the size of Iraqi Kurds), the Kurds living in Eastern Turkey were 3.2 million, and the Kurds living in Syria were 320000. (Akbari, 2009: 160-162).

External Factors

Separate contacts between ethnic groups and political groups with each other or with foreign countries in separate domains independent of the State Department and outside the diplomatic and governmental customs. For example, the strategic alliance of the Zionist regime with the
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northern Kurds against the Sunni Arabs has threatened Turkey and tensions in relations between the Turks and the regime. In Iraq, for example, the proximity and union of the Sunnis and the New Testament will lead to the passage of moderate Kurds and Shiites, or the Sunnis and Shiites of the Nationalist Alliance, the Islamist Shiites and the Kurds, with a sense of intimidation.

This fact makes it very difficult to establish an ethnic balance in the political arena and the Iraqi government, which is the inevitable strategy of democratization in this country, and any balance in this area is fragile and unstable. That's why the United States, after four years of political-military presence in Iraq, stopped trying to model Iraq as a democratic model of the Middle East and changed its strategy in that country. Indeed, the United States thinks that, due to the nature of the Iraqi type of Iraq towards the Middle East, the fate of each of its social groups can be a mirror for their respective peoples and religions in other countries of the region, but the mysterious logic and variety of patterns of friendship and hostility In Iraq, this optimism ended, and Bush, in his proposed strategy to Congress in 2007, explicitly stated that the United States is looking for a regional solution to the Iraq problem. In other words, the United States decided to change its type of game in Iraq from ideological play to compete or co-operate with other regional actors to expand the sphere of influence in Iraq. One of the reasons why the country was negotiating with the Islamic Republic of Iran in Iraq was the same change in the game. As the outcome of this change in the second new Iraqi parliamentary election on March 7, 2010 marked the three-year American effort in this regard. Al-Iraqiyah's list includes some secular Shiites, Sunnis, Nouvetians and Turkmen; Nodwik received seats from the sixties and five parliamentary seats and won the first place among the lists. The most voters in the Arab list they were Sunni, and Saudi Arabia, Syria, Turkey, Jordan, Egypt, and the United Arab Emirates supported the list. The United States did not officially support the coalition during the election, but then it attempted to coalitions between the Al-Iraqiyah and the government-led coalition led by Nouri al-Maliki, who won 89 seats in the elections and represented nationalist Shiites (Khosravi, 2011: 206-207).

Difficulties in Achieving National Unity

Paradox of State-building (Security-Democracy)

In the case of Iraq, this situation is more than anything else within the meaning of internal cohesion. Given the fragile situation of ethnic groups and the intolerance of ethnic balance in this country, the ethnic issue will be a security issue until the unpredictable future, and it can not be regarded as an unprotected security, and at the same time, the security of seeing ethnic issues in other countries in this security suite will exacerbate this image in the Iraqi
government. This leads to a phenomenon that can be called the paradox of security and democracy in Iraq, and that the future Iraqi government can not become a post-modern state in terms of ethnic politics, and at most it is a modern state. In other words, democratization and the granting of political freedoms to different identities and ethnicities and security means increasing the role of the central government in controlling order and security among the various ethnicities and identities in Iraq are not interconnected, and a relationship have a paradoxical. In fact, democratic national politics in the current world, which is the inevitable way of democratization in Iraq, is within the framework of post-modern states. In these states, based on identity politics, the ethnic issue is not a security problem, and the policy of difference prevents security from seeing ethnic issues. (Pakolski, 240: 1388) While Iraq is structurally intrinsically national and regional, Can not play in this framework. That is why Bozan and Weaver argue that "the pursuit of a weak / strong range of nations is the most commonly used method of classifying contemporary governments into three types of postmodern, modern and premodern".

Non-Cooperate in National Identity

Over the 80 years since Iraq's existence, the country has faced numerous crises that have occurred in the form of civil wars, coups and foreign adventures. The major problem that Iraqi governments face within the country is how to interact with socio-economic units and ethnic and sectarian groups. The cultural and social diversity in Iraq has created a problem of internal coherence and a continuous effort to gain political legitimacy for the rulers. In some cases, attempts to forge and instill a common identity in Iraq's heterogeneous Iraq have become key instruments for the rule of law, especially in recent decades.

Such conditions, at the head of the inability of the Iraqi governments to create an Iraqi national identity in such a way that all Iraqis from every tribe, tribe, and religion, are among the most important reasons for the use of central Iraqi governments for militarism and the adoption of a policy of repression inside (Ahmadi, 2005: 251 and 76-59). The borders of Iraq today cover very complex boundaries that are still not integrated into a single political society with a common understanding of identity, and the task of reconciling and integrating the Iraqi people which has continued steadily since the British mandate in Iraq, has not been completed at all. Any regime that comes to work in Iraq will face difficult choices in struggling to strike a balance between Iraqi unity, domestic peace and human rights, because the sense of national unity in Iraq has never been strong. (Marr, 2001: 25)

According to some, the establishment and implementation of important projects such as democracy and the founding of democratic institutions have failed due to the lack of solidarity and national identity, as modern nationalist and conservative infrastructures, that is, passion for belonging to There is no nation. Democracy is emerging on a large scale, and rooted in the emergence of a nation. The people of Iraq are not yet a nation, because the passion of the nation in them still does not dominate ethnic and tribal membership. In this infamous mix, each tribe can be an enemy to another tribe and tribe. However, in the rooted state-nation structure, the "enemy" always lies outside the national borders. There is still someone called "National interests and interests" do not know which are the ideas of modern nationalism. For this reason, tribes and tribes can kill each other for the motive of long-lasting hatreds or tribal hatreds, or tribal and tribal enthusiasm for war Occupation "infidel's bastard", not the enemy of the nation.

In general, based on the above, ethnic and religious diversity, distinct tribal identities, interconnectedness and ethno-religious interconnections, the drawing of the political borders of the country by foreigners, the complete and unstable process of the nation-state process in Iraq, The discussion of nationalism in the form of ethnic nationalism, the ethnic domination of the Sunni Arab minority, and efforts to preserve and stabilize their domination of the country, the tendency to escape the Kurdish center, the political, economic, social and cultural discrimination of the central government against the Shiite Arabs, the Kurds, Turkmen and Assyrians and their repression by resorting to militarism, the concentration of various demographic groups in distinct geographic regions Eidan and Kurds in oil fields), along with the incorrect methods of Iraqi leaders to solve the tribal and tribal traditions and their inability to create an Iraqi national identity, are the main obstacles to national unity and social solidarity among the Iraqi people. It has led to the emergence of potential and actual divergence fields especially
The Impact of Different Ethnicities in the Realization of Political Federalism in Iraq, from Post Saddam to 2018

in the north, east and south east of this country (Ahmadi, 2005: 68-60).

FUNCTIONAL CONVERGENCE OR DIVERGENCE OF FEDERALISM

Federalism is a golden road to steadily reducing ethnic conflicts, but federalism may also provide ground for harsh and counter-responses. Federalization of the state may increase it, instead of reducing the dangers of gross violation of human rights. Especially for ethnic minorities living under the rule of the majority government in the federal government. In this case, retaliation against Sunni Arabs living in the Shiite or Kurdish federal units will continue, ethnic cleansing and compulsory displacement will continue, and smaller and smaller minorities such as Christian, Turkmen and Yazidi are discriminated against by state governments. Will face. (Yeilaqi, 2011: 265-266).

The issue of Kirkuk can be considered as one of the most important internal issues in Iraq, whose role and function of the domestic actors must be carefully considered, in order to understand how foreign powers can influence it. Based on the balance of power in Iraq, none of the stakeholder players will be the absolute winner and no absolute losers. Neglect and mutual need are the basis of the attitude of the country's ethnic-religious groups towards each other, which in its place precludes the establishment of strategic alliances and reliance on tactical and expedient agreements (HaghPanah, 2008: 79)

CHALLENGES WITHIN IRAQI SOCIETY

These challenges are:
- Ethnic Challenge between Arabs and Kurds
- The religious challenge between Shiites and Sunnis
- Political challenge between supporters and opponents of the government
- The challenge between US supporters and opponents
- The challenge between secularists and Islamists
- The challenge between the federalists and the partisans (Nami & Mohammadpour, 2008: 234-233).

POLITICAL SYSTEMS OF THE MIDDLE EAST AND THE INFLUENCE OF THE IRAQI POLITICAL SYSTEM

The patterns of governance in the Middle East area have opened up a rather insignificant model of governance to Iraqi ethnic groups. The structure, content, nature, approach and functioning of political systems from North Africa to West Asia, and in particular the neighboring Iraqi political regimes, are not such
that Iraqi leaders will be considered seriously in shaping the political system in Iraq. Specifically, in the Middle East, four patterns of governance are significant; each with its own particular considerations and capabilities cannot be generalized to the current Iraqi society:

**Irreligion Pattern**

Turkey is the most prominent example of the secular pattern of the country's administration in the region and its neighbors, which suffers from severe bottlenecks for the administration of the country, especially the Kurdish regions. In spite of the particular attention given by Ankara authorities to the improvement of the economic, social, cultural and political situation in the Kurdish regions of eastern Turkey in recent years, major construction projects have been implemented to transform the face of the four Kurdish provinces and to implement the constitutional amendments of the country. However, the effects of cultural repression, the rejection of the Kurdish Kurds of Turkey and their address to the Turks of the mountains, the application of harsh cracking policies, the violation of the most obvious human rights of the Kurds, as well as economic backwardness continue to play a role in the minds and spirit of the Kurds in the region.

**Theoretic-Ideological Pattern**

In the definition of theocratic political regimes, most scholars refer to state regimes and states that the official authorities and their chief principals are spiritual leaders or clerical elders, and in fact the full complement of religion and politics and its focus is on managing the country. At present, the most spectacular example of the theocratic and ideological model of governance is not only in the Gulf and Middle East, but also in the political system of the Islamic Republic of Iran globally.

The theocratic-ideological model of the Shiite axis with the role of the fool of the cleric and the supreme leader, considering the composition of the population and the presence of the Sunnis, Kurds, Turkmens and Christians in Assyrian and Chaldeans, is a serious consideration and, even if settled, could give the pretext to the traditional opponents Iraqi Shiites to sabotage the society and disintegrate the Iraqi state.

**Traditional Pattern - Tribal**

The political system in the Gulf States. Qatar, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Oman, Bahrain, Syria and Kuwait are a manifestation of the family pattern - tribal leaders of the country. These alien political systems, with the most obvious human rights-citizenship of their people, are considered the worst option facing the political-social groups for the future of Iraq, and in fact there is no significant difference between the Ba'ath regime with these political systems and, more or less, The Saddam government's complicit in suppressing civil liberties and the basic rights of the Iraqi people is considered.

**The Pluralist Model**

Lebanon is a typical example of the pluralist model in the region. In this country, a number of ethnic-religious structures and institutions of power have been distributed in a somewhat balanced way between Christians and Sunni and Shiite Muslims. Although the political system of the country is among the most democratic political systems in the Middle East, however, two decades of conflict and conflict have drawn
a shattered image of the country's governance and democracy. The lack of a proper governance pattern in the Middle East area has more and more clearly revealed the need for the establishment of a political system based on indigenous components and federal, constitutional, and democratic features of the region and Iraq. This urgent need reinforced the position, role and position of ethnic-religious groups in establishing a new model of governance in Iraq (Bureau of Political and International Studies, 2005: 135-130).

**Conclusion**

Multi-ethnic nations, like Iraq, have their own characteristics and can not be generalized to other countries. Due to the fact that it has not only different ethnicities, but also a number of religions and religions, Iraq, which in itself makes it more difficult to internalize the country, so it should be very cautious and rational in relation to Iraq. And providing one-sided, ideological and fanatical solutions can lead to an end to.

Democratization and the granting of political freedoms to different identities and ethnicities is a progressive and postmodern process that is followed in all advanced Western industrialized countries and is a step towards political and social development. On the other hand, security is to increase the role of the central government in controlling the order and security among the various ethnic groups and identities in Iraq, which is the safeguarding of freedom and independence that has been formed in Iraq for decades and continues to lead to political and social development. On the other hand, security is to increase the role of the central government in controlling the order and security among the various ethnic groups and identities in Iraq, which is the safeguarding of freedom and independence that has been formed in Iraq for decades and continues to lead to political and social development. On the other hand, security is to increase the role of the central government in controlling the order and security among the various ethnic groups and identities in Iraq, which is the safeguarding of freedom and independence that has been formed in Iraq for decades and continues to lead to political and social development.

Of course, the contradictions of democratization and national security block the way to a post-modern state to a certain degree, and remain the same as a modern state. Therefore, democratization and national security in Iraq are incompatible and have a paradoxical relationship. In this way, democratic politics in the current world, which is the inevitable way of democratization in Iraq, is meaningful within the context of post-modern states. However, Iraq can not play in this context in terms of internal and regional structural realities. Most of all, the Kurds are seeking federalism, as they see it as a step towards independence and the achievement of an independent Kurdish state.

What has been included under the Kurdish constitution is a kind of federalism with dual powers in the central government. Of course, the Kurds know Kirkuk the capital of Kurdish federalism and are prepared to pay any expenses to obtain Kirkuk. If federalism is realized, the Kurds may be desirable, but Sunni Arabs should fight for control over Kirkuk for many years. Certainly, federalism in the Sunni Arab region (west of Iraq) without Kirkuk, a country or a region without economies.

Shiite Arabs, with 9 provinces in the south, and energy reserves and seas, will not lose anything in the event of the formation of federalism, and can, in addition to the southern provinces, have the rule of Baghdad and Diyala also with the majority of the Shia population in the long run. It is theirs and, better than that, the existence of aries is a continuous and valuable economic gain for Shiites. In the event of the formation of federalism and the continuation of the crisis in Kirkuk, the internal Iraqi crisis will turn from Shiite-Sunni to Kurdish-Sunni.

Federalism now seems to be the only way out of the internal Iraqi crisis, because nowadays Iraqi heritage, each of which seeks to preserve its position, can not, in the current circumstances, think of the option of democracy, because it fails to fetch Negative and bad result, and eventually fail, and if the democratic option fails for some reason, this negative attitude toward democracy can not be eradicated for a long time from the minds of the ethnic groups and it will emerge a disagreeable effect.

Given the proportion of Iraq's ethnic population, which is roughly 60 percent Shiite, 18 percent, 19 percent are Sunni Arabs, and 3 percent are Turkmen, Assyrian, Yazidi, Sabian and Nethans. Obviously, in the true sense of democracy, the Iraqi government Shiites will be available and Shiite sovereignty over Iraq, except for Shiites in Iraq, is not desirable by others. Therefore, the Sunnis will strongly oppose democracy in Iraq and will use their capabilities and capabilities to prevent such situations. Of course democracy will not be open in the current situation, democracy must be done in a step-by-step, precise and accountable process. First, federalism monitors and strengthens the position and strength of ethnic groups, and after the collapse of inter-ethnic, inter-ethnic, and inter-religious conflicts, then the bells of democracy in Iraq must be played. Only then can an interethnic engagement be
found that in a Kurdish or Sunni Arab society, the Kurdish or Sunni Arabs will never feel uncomfortable with democracy because in the post-modern Iraqi state a Kurdish president, or a Shiite prime minister, or one Sunnis will not provide the interests of one or more special groups and will meet the maximum demands of the Iraqi people.

REFERENCES


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