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Factors Which Influence Congress's Decision to Override a Presidential Veto: A Study of the Veto Process

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ABSTRACT

The objective of this paper is to investigate, both historically and analytically, the veto process between the President and Congress. The uses and functions of presidential vetoes, as well as factors affecting veto and overriding actions, will be explored. A systemic model of the veto process is proposed; it is applied first to an examination of one and two-house sustaining actions from the Pierce administration through President Reagan's first term, then to an in-depth empirical analysis of second-house veto override decisions over a 41-year period (1940 through 1980). In the concluding section, several suggestions for future research in the area are offered.

INTRODUCTION

Uses and Functions of Vetoes

Edward Mason (1890) claims that "a long succession of messages has set forth a great variety of objections, but they may be reduced to one of two heads—constitutionality and expediency." While the former category uses the Constitution directly for justification, the latter category encompasses instances where the executive acts to prevent what he views as unwise policy by Congress, explains the author. Carlton Jackson (1967) states that the president can use the veto in three distinct ways: to force the legislature to materially change a bill so that it will be acceptable to the chief executive; to kill a bill altogether so as to prevent an unsatisfactory proposal from becoming law; and to force a quorum of Congress to re-pass a vetoed bill by a two-thirds vote rather than by simple majority. Jackson believes that by using the veto the president emphasizes, for the most part, a positive position in government. Watson and Thomas (1983) suggest the impact of the veto on policy is both positive and negative. It is negative because it "signifies that an impasse exists between the President and Congress," but has a positive function as a bargaining tool to shape legislation, according to the authors. Keefe (1980) asserts the functions of presidential vetoes include a means whereby presidents can resist change; to week out legislation deemed inappropriate; to contain congressional power and initiative; and to prompt Congress to revise pending legislation. For Keefe and Ogul (1981) the veto is both a defensive tool and a vehicle to influence legislative behavior. The researchers delineate several factors which contribute to the increased employment of the veto in the twentieth century, including (1) the problems confronting American politics as a result of industrialization, urbanization and international crisis; (2) rising public expectations and demands for government action; and (3) a growing scope and intensity of political conflict.

Some researchers contend that the veto is a reflection of the president's power, influence, and leadership over Congress. Tatalovich and Daynes (1984) state that the veto is "an extremely effective power." Hargrove and Nelson (1984) hold Gerald Ford's presidency illustrates the veto's potential as a source of executive power. Egger and Harris (1966) emphasize executive influence in the legislative process in terms of number of bills stopped from becoming law. Corwin (1956), Polsby (1964), Binkley (1964), Egger (1967), and Jackson (1967) mention the veto's function as a weapon of legislative leadership by the chief executive.

Alternately, Edwards and Wayne (1985) postulate the veto is "an inherently negative element in the president's arsenal…" Neustadt

(1960) suggests that presidents with damaged public support might resort to negative measures such as the veto. Kessler (1982) seems to concur with Neustadt's assessment by stating that "vetoes are by their very nature negative and friction-producing." Other scholars emphasize the power-sharing character of vetoes, assuming that veto behavior can best be understood as an indicator of the mood of executive-legislative relations (Lee, 1975) or conflict between the branches (Hinckley, 1983) rather than a measure of actual strength.

Factors Affecting Veto and Override Actions

Researchers are in general agreement about some of the factors which cause chief executives to employ the veto power. Kessler (1982) and Ripley (1978) contend that presidents whose party is in a minority in Congress are more likely to resort to the veto than if their party control the legislature. Additionally, Van Der Slik (1977) states vetoes are used more by conservative chief executives than liberal ones. Hinckley (1983) asserts both the popularity of the incumbent president and his party's composition in Congress are important variables to consider in identifying veto trends.

Jackson's (1967) study cites several factors which influence Congress's veto overriding actions, including party affiliation, sectional conflicts, political and economic conditions, and the image of the president. Keefe and Ogul (1981) examine how congressional overrides are related with other measures of congressional attitudes. They discover that the rate of overriding actions correlates .30 with enate rejection of Cabinet members nominated by the president throughout the nation's history, and that from 1947-1971 congressional overriding is inversely related (-.60) to the amount of legislative success a president has on bills where a clear-cut position is taken.

Recent empirical studies by Lee (1975) and Copeland (1983) have shed light on the veto process. Lee examines "basic factors that are operative in producing considerable variation among and within presidencies." The independent variables in his study are categorized as person, power situation, and environmental factors. Lee conducts a multiple regression procedure based on data from 71 Congresses (21-91) in order to assess the impact of each variable on frequency of veto and overriding actions. Generally, he finds that presidential veto behavior is more significantly accounted for by background and power situation than by environment. He concludes that presidential propensity to veto increases (1) when the chief executive is a Democrat; (2) in an inverse proportion to the number of years spent in Congress; (3) when Congress is controlled by the opposition party; and (4) in direct proportion to the percentage of electoral votes the incumbent received in the last election, while the propensity to override increases (1) when Congress is controlled by the opposition party; (2) in direct proportion to the percentage of electoral votes for the president in the previous election; (3) when Congress convenes after midterm elections; and (4) in an inverse proportion to the degree of military crisis.

Employing Lee's study as a guide, Copeland (1983) conducts a regression analysis of factors affecting vetoes and overrides, with the year as the unit of analysis. Most of the variables Copeland tests are adaptations of Lee's; eight of the 12 variables are measured dichotomously: year in tern; economic slump; whether the president is a Democrat; if the executive had congressional experience; party control in Congress; international crisis. The other variables include electoral mandate (percentage of electoral vote); scope of government (coded as the log of one-half of the total number of bills passed by each Congress); and overrides (one variable measured as the number of overrides, the other as the square of the number of overrides). Two models are used to examine the data-the log of all public bill vetoes and the square root of the percentage of vetoes. Copeland finds that the two models account for about 45% of the variation in the use of the veto. The Democrat, electoral mandate, scope of government, opposition control, and both override variables are significant at the .05 probability level in the log model, whereas the Democrat, electoral mandate, opposition control, second year in term, and both override measures are significantly related to employment of the veto in the square root model.

A Systemic Model of the Veto Process

Four models have been prevalent in studies of veto-veto override behavior, three of which are time-based, while the fourth offers a numerical classification. The first model, derived from the work of Mason (1890), relies on a hypothesis that increased veto use by presidents is a consequence of the steady augmentation of

presidential power in general. The second model postulates that a long-term cyclic pattern in veto behavior has occurred due to fluctuations between executive and legislative dominance in government (Egger, 1966; Galloway, 1961; Wilcox, 1971; Dodd, 1980; and Hargrove and Nelson, 1985). The third model assumes that presidents' veto behavior changes during their incumbency; it is supported in studies by Corwin (1956), Burns (1963), Small (1970), and Copeland (1983).

By cross plotting the percentage of public bill vetoes with the percentage of overriding actions on regular vetoes for 71 Congresses, Lee (1975) develops a four-fold typology. The first veto patter is cooperative and successful, indicating a low percentage of both vetoes and overrides (Lincoln, McKinley, and Lyndon Johnson are examples). The second type of veto pattern, conflictual and successful, is characterized by a high number of vetoes but a low number of overrides by Congress (Franklin Roosevelt, Cleveland). Cooperative and unsuccessful, meaning that the president vetoes few bills but Congress overrides a high ratio of them, is the third type of veto pattern (Arthur, Nixon). A fourth type of veto pattern is labeled conflictual and unsuccessful, in which the relationship between the two branches includes a high number of vetoes as well as overrides (Pierce, Buchanan).

The models above are inaccurate and incomplete conceptions of the veto process. The time-based models necessitate adopting a unit of analysis which fails to capture the dynamics of presidential-congressional relations. In almost all cases, the year or each Congress is identified, with the number of observations being of prime importance to researchers. The cyclic model attempts to place veto and override behavior into the wider framework of presidential power and leadership, while ignoring more relevant factors which must be tested. As Lee (1975) himself acknowledges, the numerical-based classification scheme is inadequate for explaining instances where presidential-congressional veto relations have changed over the executive's tenure.

Conversely, the model to be analyzed in the remainder of this paper represents both a synthesis and an extension of the aforementioned models, and is hitherto referred to as the systemic model of the veto process. Initially, the type of bill Congress sends to the president must be known: public bills relate to general appropriations and policy issues, private bills to individual cases. Vetoes of public bills occur because of constitutional or policy objections, while private bill vetoes are most often based on bureaucratic determinations of merit and evidence (Harvard Law Review, 1966; congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1981). Although Congress more or less defers to presidential vetoes of private bills—there have been only seven overrides of them in the nation's history-the legislature is much more confrontational in their response to public bill vetoes.

Many prior studies of the veto process have neglected the distinction between regular and pocket vetoes, or have not recognized the vital differences in executive-legislative veto relations before and after Zachary Taylor's presidency (including broadening reasons for issuing vetoes, greater political party stability, and the unique "caretaker" philosophy of the Whig presidents). The result has been misleading and deceptive information on veto-veto override trends. For instance, Congressional Quarterly Almanac (1981) reports that from 1789-1981 chief executives vetoed a total of 2391 bills, of which 94 or 3.8% became law through congressional override. Keefe (1980) states that about 3% of the 3000 vetoes cast by all presidents have been overridden. Ripley (1978) mentions a total of "less than 4%". Those few researchers who have recognized that pocket vetoes are unchallengeable (Tatalovich and Daynes, 1984.; Hargrove and Nelson, 1984) estimate that about 7% of regular vetoes have been overridden. However, if we separate vetoes and overrides of public and private bills, as well as pocket vetoes of the two types of legislation, a much more comprehensive picture emerges. Although less than 1% of all private bill vetoes have been overridden, almost 20%, or one-fifth of all public bill vetoes have become law through congressional override. Private bill vetoes are twice as prevalent as public bill vetoes, both through regular means and by way of pocket veto.

The systemic model is composed of four sets of factors, which affect the veto process. The first set of factors includes presidential components such as reasons for vetoing legislation, personal characteristics, the party affiliation of the executive, public attitudes toward the president, and electoral considerations. Those factors comprising the second set are exclusive to Congress: type of bill involved in the override

decision; which house of Congress took action; the percentage by which the first house of Congress considering a veto overrode it; whether a veto reaction takes place before or after midterm elections; and if the congressional action occurs during the election season. The third set of factors is interdependent institutional characteristics associated with the veto process. For instance, the percentage of members of Congress sharing the president's party affiliation is an indicator of veto or override success, as are activities which occur within the context of a particular veto override decision. The shared powers between the president and the legislature provide the opportunity for interaction; the above factors define the level of cohesion, conflict, cooperation, and consensus between the two branches.

Finally, the fourth set of factors can be labeled environmental conditions which affect the veto process. Economic variables like unemployment or inflation (or a measure which combines the two), together with periods of substantial U.S. military involvement abroad, are components of this set.

One and Two-House Sustaining Actions

Since the beginning of the Pierce administration, there have been 126 presidential vetoes sustained by one house of Congress, but only 25 sustained by the second house. However, this disparity masks a differential success rate for the president and Congress in the veto override process: while the chief executive is dominant in first-house sustaining actions, Congress usually wins at the second-house override juncture. Presidential success is measured by adding the number of one and two-house sustaining actions and dividing by the number of veto overrides against a president. The percentage of success Congress has with an individual president in the veto process is measured by dividing the number of overrides by all second-house decisions. Presidential success is found to be slightly more than 2% higher than congressional success. Surprisingly, Presidents Nixon and Ford fare better than the ensuing two presidents, Carter and Reagan, in both categories.

Using all one and two-house sustaining actions as the unit of analysis, we can test to what extent variables encompassed in the systemic model are correlated with one another. Specifically, four variables are of interest—the president's party affiliation; which house of Congress sustained the veto; the type of bill, public or private, under consideration; and whether the veto override decision occurred during a post-midterm election Congress. The president's party affiliation is coded as 0 for Democrat and 1 for Republican; which house is coded as 0 for the House of Representatives and 1 for the Senate; type bill is coded as 0 for a private bill and 1 for a public bill; and post-midterm is coded as 0 for no and 1 for yes.

In assessing the findings, we first note that there is a higher correlation between Republican Party affiliation and public bill vetoes in one-house sustaining actions; a separate cross-tabulation reveals these variables are significant at the .01 probability level (chi-square statistic). Secondly, Republican Party affiliation and the post-midterm measure are more positively correlated in second-house veto sustaining actions. Thirdly, the Senate is highly correlated with the type bill and post-midterm variables in second-house sustain; there is little relationship between house of Congress and the other measures in first-house veto sustaining actions.

Second-House Veto Override Decisions

In the final part of this paper, probit analysis is employed to test factors which influence Congress's decision to override a presidential veto. The unit of analysis here is the second house of Congress, denoting that a particular presidential veto has already been overridden by one house. The rationale for choosing the decision by the second house is twofold: being the last stop in the veto process, the action taken is qualitatively different from prior action and its consequence final; focusing on second-house decisions permit an examination of immediate factors related to congressional overrides. I shall analyze 50 congressional override decisions which took place from 1940 through 1980. The study excludes Presidents Kennedy and Johnson, who had no vetoes overridden during their tenure. Seven administrations and 16 Congresses are investigated. Two variables each from the presidential, congressional, and environmental sets are tested, while four interdependent institutional factors are analyzed, for a total of 10 variables.

The presidential components are popularity and executive election season. Popularity is measured as the percent change in public approval of the president from the time he vetoes a bill until the veto override decision by the second house occurs. The percentages are taken from Gallop Poll data. It is assumed that

the higher the positive change in a president's popularity, the less the chance of override, since Congress is aware of the political stakes involved in overruling a president's prerogative. The second variable in this set is executive election season, coded as a 0 if the veto override decision occurs during an off year and a 1 if an incumbent president is running for reelection. Though the executive has the resources of his office available, they may be of little value when a veto has already been overridden by one house. Further, unless the bill at issue represents a major policy interest of the administration it may be counterproductive for the president to bind his campaign with the fortunes of the veto process. Therefore, the effect of this variable should be to decrease the chance of override.

The second set of factors is congressional components, including the percentage by which the first house of Congress overrode a presidential veto, and whether the final override decision happens during a post-midterm Congress. The former variable is measured using the number of percentage points above the minimum two-third (67%) necessary for override. There should be a clear tendency to override if the first house of Congress overturned the veto by a wide margin. The second congressional factor is measured using a dummy variable to indicate whether the second veto override decision occurs after midterm elections (0 for no, 1 for yes). The hypothesis accompanying this variable is that a post-midterm Congress will be more combative and confrontational with the president than during his first few years in office, and hence will be more inclined to override a veto. The claim above is supported by several scholars who identify performance during the third and fourth years of a term as crucial to a president's power and reelection chances (New York Times, 1982).

The third set consists of two environmental conditions, a misery period and a military period. The misery period is measured according to the sum percentage of unemployment and inflation during the year of the veto override decision, while the military period indicates whether the U.S. is involved in a declared war (World War II) or major foreign military commitment (Korea, Vietnam) at the time the veto override decision ensues (0 for no, 1 for yes). Lee (1975) finds his measures of economic instability and military crisis have contradictory influence on congressional propensity to override vetoes, with the former having a positive effect and the latter being inversely related to overrides. I propose the effect the effect of my environmental variables on overrides is just the opposite. It is likely that many presidential vetoes issued during a period of economic decline are for fiscal reasons and that Congress is apt to sustain the veto. Conversely, Lee's "rally round the flag" justification for the hypothesis that major military action decreases the chance of override is flawed. For one, foreign military action involving U. S. forces does not by itself produce domestic policy differences. Further, a major military commitment could actually exacerbate tensions between the branches, especially if the conflict is an undeclared war and the administrations is acting in a domineering, secretive manner.

The interdependent institutional set is comprised of four factors: level of partisan support in Congress; executive agreements; presidential appearances before a joint session of the legislature, and the nomination success the administration has vis-à-vis the Senate. Partisan support is measured by the number of members sharing the president's party affiliation in the second house considering override. A president who enjoys a party majority in Congress should be able to find other ways of convincing them to accept his policy priorities than the veto, but when the action is taken override is more difficult if the president has a party majority in the second house.

While the partisan support variable is coded by each two-year Congress, the remaining three variables are computed in yearly terms, including the number of executive agreements negotiated by the president during the year when the final veto override decision occurs; the number of appearances the president makes to a joint session of Congress during the year but prior to the veto override decision by the second house; and the nomination success the administration has during the year the veto override decision takes place, measured by percent nominees confirmed out of the total number submitted to the Senate. The first and third yearly factors should serve to lessen the chance of veto override, whereas increased appearances signal problems and will result in a greater probability of override. Though executive agreements are unilaterally negotiated by the president, the policy or trade they

establish is in all likelihood known to Congress. The more the president uses executive agreements to implement policy, the less of an opportunity Congress has to overturn controversial foreign affairs issues through the veto process. The level of success the administration has in getting executive branch nominees confirmed is an indication of cooperation with, and potential influence over, the legislative branch; a high degree of confirmation success should be inversely related to veto overrides.

The final decision whether to overturn a presidential veto is the dependent variable; it is measured dichotomously: either the second house of Congress fails to gather a two-thirds vote, thus sustaining the veto, or the second house follows suit with the first house and the bill automatically becomes law. Accordingly, we must employ a methodology suitable for these decision-making possibilities.

Probit analysis assumes that the relationship between a set of independent variables and the probability of an event occurring can best be represented by a nonlinear S-shaped function (cumulative standard normal distribution) rather than by a linear function as is common for regression. The properties associated with the cumulative standard normal distribution are: (1) the distribution is flatter at the tails than in the center; and (2) the probability of an event taking place is restricted to the interval from 0 to 1 (Arnold, 1979).

Aldrich and Cnuddle (1975) state that estimates for the probit model are developed by the method of maximum likelihood, which capitalizes on the assumed normality of the error term. In contrast to the least square estimation methods, which are concerned with finding parameter estimates that provide the best fit between the model and the data, maximum likelihood estimation chooses parameter estimates that imply the highest probability of having obtained the observed sample (Aldrich and Nelson, 1984).

Probit analysis has previously been used to explain decision making in all three branches of government, including Ostrom and Job's (1982) study of the president and the political use of force, Arnold's (1979) work developing a theory of congressional influence over the bureaucracy, and Segal's (1984) analysis of Supreme Court decision-making regarding search and seizure cases over a twenty-year period.

RESULTS

According to Aldrich and Cnuddle (1975), the maximum likelihood coefficients (MLE's) for each independent variable and the constant are comparable to regression b-coefficients. The estimates indicate the change in the cumulative normal probability function which results from a one-unit change in the independent variable. The statistic in the third column represents the MLE divided by the standard error, and approximates a standardized normal random variable, or z-score. The z-score can be used to determine whether the coefficient is significantly different from 0 (the mean of the cumulative normal probability). The numerical value equal to -2 times the log of the likelihood ratio is a chi-square statistic where the degrees of freedom equal the number of independent variables. Aldrich and Cnuddle note this statistic permits us to test the overall significance of a model because it compares the estimated log of the likelihood function to the situation if all coefficients were 0, or the null hypothesis.

Tables 1 and 2 delineate the results of the probit procedure {see Appendix}.

Five out of the ten systemic model variables—partisan support, first house of percentage of override above the minimum, executive agreements, presidential appearances before a joint session of Congress, and whether the second house decision occurred during a military period—are statistically significant at the .05 level; the entire model is significant at the .02 level. The estimated r^2 for the equation is .80, denoting that the compendium of variables explain 80% of the variance in the dependent variable. The percent of cases predicted correctly is 84%. This means that in 42 out of 50 instances, the actual value (or result of the final decision whether or not to override a presidential veto) matched the predicted value (the category having a higher probability for each case). The mean of the dependent variable is .74, indicating that without applying the systemic model of the veto process second-house override decisions could have been predicted 74% of the time. Thus, the systemic model increased predictive accuracy of five decisions, reducing error by 10%.

Table 2 furnishes a case-by-case residual analysis and comparison of actual with predicted values. From it we can deduce there was one incorrect prediction of an override decision during FDR's tenure (1940-45), five

incorrect predictions for congressional override votes during Truman's presidency, no incorrect predictions of override decisions during the Eisenhower administration, one incorrect veto override decision each involving the Nixon and Ford terms, and no incorrect predictions for veto override votes taking place during Carter's White House years.

By analyzing the eight incorrect predictions with three systemic model indicators not included in the empirical study—the duration between presidential veto and second house veto override decision, which house of Congress took the final override vote, and whether the legislation was primarily a monetary bill or not—it is possible to improve our understanding the veto process. One anomaly apparent in the eight incorrect predictions is that the average duration between veto issuance and final override decision is 31.5 days, compared with a mean of 14 days over the 50-decision sample. Secondly, although 50% of the 50 bills were in fact monetary proposals, only one of eight or 12.5% of the incorrect predictions was monetary in content. Finally, two of the eight incorrect predictions were on noteworthy vetoes: Truman's veto of a private bill, which became the seventh and most recent private bill veto overridden by Congress; and Nixon's veto of the War Powers Resolution, also subsequently overridden.

The maximum likelihood estimates for the equation show that the executive election season, military period, and appearance measures have the strongest independent impact on the dependent variable; the last two are significant predictors of overriding rather than veto sustaining actions. Presidential appearances before joint sessions of Congress are positively correlated with the post-midterm variable (.44) and to actual overrides (.38), but inversely related to military periods (-.23) and administration's nomination success (-.67). From this evidence, the hypothesis that presidents address joint sessions of Congress to shore up waning political support certainly has credence. The level of partisan support a president has in the second house is found to be significantly inversely related to the act of overriding a presidential veto. Since the mean for partisan support is 46% over the 50 decisions studied, we can surmise that some presidents were more successful than others at having their vetoes sustained despite dealing with split or hostile (in terms of party affiliation) Congresses. Specifically, Presidents Nixon and Ford together had slightly more of their vetoes sustained by the second house of Congress (26.1%) than did the other four presidents included in the analysis (25.9%). Partisan support is inversely though not significantly correlated with the post-midterm measure.

A fourth variable found to be significantly related to actual overrides by the second house of Congress is the percentage (above minimum two-thirds) by which the first house of Congress overrode the veto at hand. This variable is positively correlated with level of partisan support (.21), actual overrides (.24), and the misery index measure (.58), though the effect of the economic indicator is much less pronounced for final veto overrides (.11).

Number of executive agreements negotiated by the administration during the year when the veto override decision takes place is the fifth significant variable in the model; it lessens the chance of override. Executive agreements are positively correlated with the post-midterm measure (.30), nomination success (.25), and executive election season (.34), but inversely related to partisan support (-.76) and overrides themselves (-.13). The fact that executive agreements are positively related to the three variables above confirms the hypothesis that they can be a tool of presidential leadership. However, their inverse relationship with partisan support leads one to question whether negotiating many executive agreements is a sign of influence over, rather than confrontation with, Congress. Admittedly, the steady growth of the latter action in relation to treaties may have contributed to the findings.

If the results are analyzed according to the set of variables identified above, the interdependent institutional set appears to explain veto override decisions best (three out of four variables are significant), followed by the congressional components and environmental conditions, where one out of two of the variables in each set are significant, and the presidential characteristic set, based on the executive election season's independent impact on override decisions. Taken as a whole, the systemic model contributes to our knowledge of the veto process over a contemporary period of American politics. What seems unique about the period under study is the much higher percentage of override success Congress had with presidential vetoes (74% with second-house decisions) compared with the

historical override success since 1853 (62%). Granted, the number of bills voted on in Congress has increased dramatically, but so has the power of the American presidency. The fact that the time frame for the probit analysis began in the latter part of Franklin Roosevelt's tenure does not bias the results, since the success rate that Congress had in overriding FDR's vetoes before 1940 was about the same as it had after 1940 (82% and 80% respectively).

CONCLUSION

Though there have been few systematic attempts to study the veto process, there is a clear indication that using different methodologies and units of analysis produces distinct results. Despite the model used to examine congressional overriding actions, all face the general limitations of using quantitative analysis in presidential research. Some of the variables employed in the probit analysis above were not quantifiable prior to 1940, whereas the effect of other factors has obviously changed over time. This study has attempted to conquer two of the "three principal constraints on using quantitative analysis to study the presidency" identified by Edwards and Wayne (1983). By focusing on the veto process and using each override decision as an observation, it has compensated for the small number of cases and lack of data constraints. However, the third constraint mentioned by Edwards and Wayne-failure to pose analytical questions—is perpetual, to be improved upon but never perfected. Three additional variables which could increase the predictability of the systemic model are the president's veto message, veto recommendations made by the Office of Management and Budget and presidential advisors, and congressional floor debate on override votes. The first and third factors might be content-analyzed or classified into general categories; together with OMB and advisor recommendations, their impact on overriding actions could be assessed.

Future research on the veto process should also address several procedures which have affected presidential-congressional relations. For instance, the practice of passing concurrent resolutions allows Congress to voice policy interest or points of view that might otherwise only come out in the veto override debate. At the same time, Congress often compounds proposed legislation by tacking on riders, or amendments which have little or no relevance to the main bill. The long-term impact which the Supreme Court's repeal of the legislative veto has on American politics, along with renewed calls for a presidential item veto, could be investigated.

All are part of the theory-building necessary to better understand the significant and unique veto process.

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APPENDIX

Table1. *Probit Estimates for Veto Override Decisions, 1940-1980*

Variable MLE/SE	MLE	SE
Partisan Support 1.724*	-.14921	.08654
First House Override % 1.825*	.10851	.05947
Post-Midterm Congress .973	.78519	.80716
Executive Agreements 1.704*	-.01592	.00934
Misery Period .883	-.09331	.10573
Appearances Before JSC 2.012*	1.55828	.77456
Military Period	2.20099	1.10344

1.995*		
Nomination Success .983	.08275	.08418
Change in Popularity 1.148	-.08105	.07058
Executive Election Season 1.576	2.72220	1.72778

N=50

Constant=-.40464

Estimated R2=.80

*-2 X LLR=-17.9640***

Mean of Dependent Variable=.74

Percent Categorized Correctly=.84

**significant at .05 level*

***significant at .02 level*

Table2. *Comparison of Actual With Predicted Values for Second-House Veto Override Decisions, 1940-1980*

President	Actual	Predicted
F. Roosevelt	1	1
F. Roosevelt	1	1
F. Roosevelt	0	1*
F. Roosevelt	1	1
F. Roosevelt	1	1**
Truman	1	1
Truman	0	0
Truman	1	1
Truman	1	1
Truman	1	1**
Truman	1	1
Truman	1	1
Truman	1	0*
Truman	0	1*
Truman	1	1
Truman	1	0*
Truman	0	1*
Truman	1	1
Truman	0	1*
Truman	1	1
Truman	1	1
Eisenhower	0	0
Eisenhower	0	0
Eisenhower	1	1
Eisenhower	1	1
Nixon	1	1
Nixon	1	1
Noxon	1	1**
Nixon	1	1**
Nixon	0	0
Nixon	0	0
Nixon	1	0*
Nixon	1	1
Ford	1	1**
Ford	1	1**
Ford	1	1
Ford	1	1

Ford	1	1
Ford	1	1
Ford	1	1
Ford	1	1
Ford	1	1
Ford	0	1*
Ford	1	1
Ford	0	0
Ford	0	0
Ford	0	0
Ford	1	1
Carter	1	1
Carter	1	1

N=50

**incorrect prediction*

***perfect prediction with variables (Probability=1.0)*

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